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The Art of War by Sun Tzu is one of, if not the most influential military
manuscripts of all time. The methodologies outlined by Sun Tzu are still being
taught at the world’s most prestigious military academies, including the U.S
Naval Academy and West Point. Sun Tzu saw war as much more than just
fighting or the movement of pawns on a board, “War is a grave affair of state; it is
a place of life and death, a road to survival and extinction, a matter to be
pondered carefully.”1 To Sun Tzu and his followers war is a matter life and
death. Not only did he understand the military tactics required for success in any
campaign, but the social and political implications of war that lead to defeat
without a single battle being fought. Sun Tzu’s work shines a light onto the
underlying factors of war, explaining in great detail how they determine the
outcome of every war past or present. His message of proper military strategy is
put on display in an emphatic fashion during the Vietnam War. By analyzing The
Art of War it becomes clear that Sun Tzu predicted the Viet Cong’s victory and
the United States’ failure centuries in advance. He was considered the greatest
military strategist of his time, but the origin and even the existence of Sun Tzu is
questioned. “As John Minford, translator of a new edition of this text, has
observed, if whoever wrote it ‘was indeed an advisor to King He Lu …, then he
would have been a contemporary of Confucius (551-478 BCE). And yet he is not
mentioned once in the Zuo Commentary, the principle source for the history of
the period. Despite this fact, by the Han dynasty (206 BCE - 220 CE), everyone
knew of Master Sun the Strategist, and his name had become inseparable from
The Art of War.”2 No matter who Sun Tzu was his legend lives on through his
famous treatise.
Sun Tzu’s story began in 500 BCE when King He Lu of the state of Wu,
located in Eastern China, called Sun Tzu to address the threat of an invasion
from the state of Chu. Sun Tzu claimed to be able to turn anyone into a soldier,
so He Lu challenged him to turn the palace women into soldiers. Sun Tzu
showed the women the basic maneuvers, appointed the two eldest women
platoon leaders and ordered the exercise to begin. After one failed attempt Sun
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Tzu reiterated his orders to the women. After the second failed attempt Sun Tzu,
in front of everyone, executed the platoon leaders and immediately appointed
two new ones. The third time he ordered them to do the exercise the women
followed his instructions perfectly and without hesitation. After the display Sun
Tzu was granted full control over the Wu army by King He Lu.
Outnumbered and out trained, Sun Tzu used his strategic principles
outlined in The Art of War, including the use of spies, deception, knowledge of
the landscape, and most importantly knowing your enemy. Using mostly guerilla
tactics Sun Tzu and the Wu forces struck quickly, yet decisively and
disappeared. Sun Tzu and his military exploits are legendary, outnumbered, out
trained, or fighting against insurmountable odds, it didn’t matter Sun Tzu
accounted for every situation and had a strategy that resulted in victory. “... Sun
Tzu’s general intent is clear - to analyze the diversity of interdependent choice
situations in warfare and to deduce efficient strategies - plans of action that lead
to victory, broadly defined.”3 Through his superior strategies and tactics Sun Tzu
was able to win the support of neighboring kingdoms who joined his fight against
the Chu. As his forces grew, Sun Tzu could go on the offensive and despite the
bad hand he was dealt he was able to defeat the Chu army in decisive fashion.
If you follow Sun Tzu and his teachings, you will go to war with victory
ensured, but if you ignore The Art of War defeat is inevitable. “Although
immensely popular in the Far East, and widely available in Europe, the message
of Sun Tzu has been seriously neglected in America.”4 Many wars throughout
history are proof of this statement, but there is no greater example than
America’s defeat in Vietnam. Did the Viet Cong defeat the United States, or did
we defeat ourselves? Despite having a much more powerful, highly trained, and
organized military the United States was defeated in Vietnam just as the
Kingdom of Chu was defeated by Sun Tzu. The Viet Cong used the principles
that Sun Tzu outlined in The Art of War, deception, use of spies, knowledge of
the enemy and landscape as their victory was ensured from the moment the
United States set foot in Vietnam.
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“Know the enemy, know yourself, and victory is never in doubt, not in a
hundred battles.”5 Superior knowledge is the key to success in warfare, therefore
before going to war, one needs to know everything about the enemy. You need
to know their culture, their history, and their strategy. The Viet Cong were
fanatically devoted to fighting to unify their country, no matter the price. The
country had constantly been at war since World War II when they fought against
the Japanese. They eventually fell victim to the Japanese occupation, but their
fighting spirit never wavered. The guerilla tactics used by the Viet Cong were
more well suited to fighting at home where they were masters of the terrain. The
United States knew of, but chose to ignore these factors about the
Vietnamese. In contrast the Viet Cong knew us. They knew as a foreign
combatant, we would fight a traditional campaign that their guerilla tactics could
pick apart. They knew the tactics behind every movement that the American
forces took. In many cases this understanding included our lack of tactics; like
our habit of blindly sending counterinsurgent patrols where they could easily be
picked off by the Viet Cong fighters they were so desperately searching
for. They knew drawing the war out would demoralize the troops and the
American public, who were already apprehensive about fighting to begin
with. The effect of this demoralization led to multiple offensive campaigns by
military leaders, which produced occasional individual and group atrocities
against non-combatants by American soldiers. These atrocities accelerated the
decline in support for the war back home, marked by numerous anti-war protests
across the nation. The continuation of the war despite the nationwide desire for
its end left a tainted feeling that surrounds the legacy of Vietnam to this day.
Vietnam was the first so called ‘televised war’, where the American news
media brought the horror of war into living rooms on a daily basis. “Vietnam
veterans for years felt tainted by the stigma of unallocated blame because of the
failure to prosecute the guilty, no matter how numerous or high ranking.” 6 In
addition to demoralizing troops overseas, drawing out the war took a drastic toll
on support of the war back home. Sun Tzu said, “No nation has ever benefited
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from a protracted war”7 America was sending citizens to and spending money on
a war the public wanted to end. It is impossible to win a war overseas when you
have virtually no support at home. The Americans and the Viet Cong had polar
opposite approaches in the Vietnam War, one based on ignorance and one
based on knowledge. One led to defeat and the other led to victory.
“The Way of war is a way of deception. When able, feign inability; when
deploying troops appear not to be. When near, appear far; when far, appear
near. Lure with bait; strike with chaos.”8 Sun Tzu believed that deception was
one of the most valuable tools in warfare. When deception is combined with
knowledge, the effectiveness of your strategy increases exponentially. The Viet
Cong were masters of deception, troop and supply movements were done in
complete secret. Using a vast underground network of tunnels the Viet Cong
were able to move troops and supplies in complete accordance with Sun Tzu’s
principle of deception. The United States failed miserably to be deceptive when
it came to movement of units. To clear a path for troops, we would carpet bomb
areas before sending ground forces to sweep out any remaining
insurgents. Wherever the bombs dropped, the troops were not far behind, and
the Viet Cong knew it. They would flock to and surround the area and, as Sun
Tzu would put it, strike with chaos. “The results consistently show that bombing
was counterproductive as a counterinsurgency practice. High frequencies of
bombing corresponded unambiguously to higher levels of downstream control by
the Viet Cong.”9 The Viet Cong would repeat this pattern as the Americans
repeated it, and were able to gain ground in the war effort as the years went on.
Vietnam is what Sun Tzu would refer to as Deadlock ground, “‘Deadlock’
means that neither side finds it advantageous to make a move. On deadlock
terrain, even if our enemy offers bait, we do not make a move; we lure him out;
we retreat. And when half his troops are out, that is our moment to strike.”10 One
of the United States’ biggest mistakes in Vietnam was going to war without a
clear objective. There was no clear cut target for the Americans to capture to
end the war, because the Viet Cong lacked a central base of operation. The Viet
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Cong were spread across the country, which prevented the United States
from attacking and wiping them out with a single blow. When troops were sent
out on patrol fewer and fewer would come back. The Viet Cong were able to pick
off both incoming and outgoing patrols by surrounding United States bases and
simply waiting for the opportunity to present itself. The Viet Cong didn’t have to
take the risk of mounting a major direct assault on United States forces because
they didn’t have to win battles to win the war. “Ultimate excellence lies not in
winning every battle but in defeating the enemy without ever fighting.”11 The Viet
Cong were winning the war without having to launch a single attack. To the Viet
Cong a war of attrition was a success because on Deadlock ground, where any
move for either side could be fatal, they would always have the ability to watch
and wait until the moment to strike presented itself.
“Spies are a key element in warfare. On them depends an army’s every
move.”12 Sun Tzu views spies as one of the most valuable assets in warfare
because of the strategic purpose they serve. He described five types of spies:
local, internal, double, dead and live. Each serving their own important strategic
purpose. Local spies come from fellow countrymen, internal come from inserting
spies into the forces of the enemy, double spies feedback false information, dead
spies deliberately provide the enemy with false information, and live spies return
with information. The Viet Cong possessed a vast intelligence network made up
of local, internal, dead and live spies. Their local spies were sympathetic
civilians. Among the South Vietnamese population the Viet Cong had supporters
that passed information gathered by simply observing the American troops. The
Viet Cong possessed internal spies, disguised as South Vietnamese soldiers that
infiltrated American bases and gathered information from within. The dead spies
would allow false information to be intercepted by American spies hopelessly
attempting to infiltrate the complex Viet Cong intelligence network. The live spies
played the largest role in the Viet Cong intelligence network. They gathered
valuable information regarding numerous aspects of the tactics and strategy of
the United States. Knowing every punch that is about to be thrown at you and
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where your opponent’s openings will be gives you an insurmountable advantage
over your opponent. The use of spies by the Viet Cong was an essential part of
their success in the war.
“Managing many is the same as managing few; it is a question of
division. Fighting with many is the same as fighting with few,”13 We think of war
as a numbers game, the side with the most soldiers and most firepower will win,
but Sun Tzu refutes this principle. He and the army of Wu were greatly
outnumbered by the Chu army, but Sun Tzu emerged victorious because of his
superior handling of strategy. He was able to get the most out of limited
resources he possessed. The Viet Cong were outnumbered and outgunned, but
like Sun Tzu they emerged victorious. The tight guerilla structure of the Viet
Cong combined with their massive network of tunnels spread across the entire
country made it impossible to deal a direct blow to a large percentage of their
insurgency. Having a suitably sized fighting force spread across the country
allowed the Viet Cong to strike decisively and then disappear anywhere without
leaving a clue where they were headed next. Contrary to the widespread strike
and disappear strategy employed by the Viet Cong the United States
consolidated their forces. American military bases provided a clear objective
point for the Viet Cong to target. The Viet Cong knew they couldn’t mount a full
out offensive on the bases themselves, but they could wait just outside and pick
off incoming and outgoing soldiers. Having a consolidated area holding all of our
troops and resources provided a clear target that the widespread Viet Cong were
able to take advantage of. The Viet Cong were able to maximize the potential of
their fighting force, despite being outmanned and outgunned they were effective
in accomplishing their objectives.
“The wise general is a Lord of Destiny; he holds the nation’s peace or peril
in his hands”14 the implementation of a strong chain of command is essential to
properly executing Sun Tzu’s strategies. The American chain of command in
Vietnam, headed by General Westmoreland, was accustomed to fighting a
traditional campaign proved another one of Sun Tzu’s principles, “The general
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who cannot master his anger orders his troops out like ants, sending one in three
to their deaths.”15 They were conditioned to fighting a traditional war, but now
sending troops on what would be routine counterinsurgency patrols was turned
into marching them to their deaths. “Westmoreland was not proposing a ‘new’
concept of operations or a change in basic military strategy. Offensive
operations designed to locate main force units and their bases remained the
focus of his strategy.”16 Fighting a search and destroy war in an environment like
Vietnam showed a clear lack of leadership, flexibility, and military creativity in the
United States’ command structure. “Lewy is especially critical of Westmoreland’s
search and destroy strategy. It represents, he says, the ‘traditional attack
mission of infantry,’ but since the ‘setting of a counterinsurgency was in the
environment of Vietnam posed anything but traditional problems, the results of
this conventional way of thinking and acting were to prove a great
disappointment.’”17 As previously discussed Vietnam had no endgame, there was
no objective that the United States could take to bring the war would end. The
United States military was running a search and destroy campaign with nothing
particular to search for and destroy. The Vietnam War became an exercise in
futility that, according to the records of the National Archives, resulted in the loss
of 58,220 American lives. “Not until 1995 did Vietnam release its official estimate
of war dead: as many as 2 million civilians on both sides and some 1.1 million
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong fighters.”18
The Viet Cong did not experience the same failures from their commander
General Vo Nguyen Giap. General Westmoreland and General Giap were polar
opposites. Westmoreland received training at West Point, Giap’s education in
warfare was completely self taught. Westmoreland was traditional, rigid, and
lost, Giap was untraditional, adaptive, and won. General Giap was not pressured
to win the war in a quick hard hitting campaign like his United States
counterpart. He took the methodic approach of guerilla strike and disappear
warfare. His command over the Viet Cong was characterized by organized,
quick strikes that devastated the United States forces that were attempting a
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traditional campaign in an untraditional environment. His leadership of the Viet
Cong provided an effective guerilla strategy that helped them win the
war. Westmoreland and Giap took very different approaches that reflected their
backgrounds, one led to crushing defeat and the other to undeniable victory,
proving Sun Tzu’s idea that the general holds the fate of the nation in their
hands.
The one time the Viet Cong ignored Sun Tzu it led to disaster, the Tet
Offensive on January 30th 1968. It started as a brilliant Sun Tzu deception
tactic, agreeing to an armistice during the holiday period known as Tet, then
launching an attack when the enemies guard would be down. The error in the
plan was that Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Communist North Vietnamese, wanted
the victory to end the war in one decisive blow. “While the Americans were not
winning, they had the power to expand the war. On the other hand, while the
communists had successfully managed to withstand the US military power, they
were not able to achieve a decisive victory. Their goal continued to be a decisive
victory in a relatively short time.”19 The Tet Offensive ignored the fact that
Vietnam was ‘Deadlock ground’ making a direct attack disadvantageous and
unnecessary. Tet would consist of multiple widespread attacks on United States
bases all across the country ignoring Sun Tzu’s idea that, “The skillful warrior
attacks so that the enemy cannot defend; he defends so the enemy cannot
attack.”20 General Giap didn’t want to go through with the Tet Offensive because
he saw the flaws of the plan, despite his General’s Ho Chi Minh demanded the
plan be carried out. Spreading the Viet Cong guerrilla fighting force so thin for a
widespread direct assault went against the winning formula the Viet Cong had
produced and proved a costly decision. By attacking where the Americans could
defend themselves the Viet Cong cracked open a window of opportunity for the
American soldiers who could now take the fight to the Viet Cong. The Tet
Offensive led to an extended period of fighting that produced numerous
casualties on both sides. Tet had no winners or losers, but the military
consequences were more detrimental to the Viet Cong resulting in the loss of
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70,000 soldiers. The Viet Cong lost their strategic advantage and the press
coverage of the Tet Offensive greatly impacted public opinion of the war, “Many
members of the American media used Tet to underscore their arguments that the
war in Vietnam was unwinnable and venerable broadcast journalist Walter
Cronkite questioned U.S policies in a February 1968, asserting, ‘we are now in a
stalemate.’ Lyndon Johnson allegedly responded, ‘If we’ve lost Cronkite, we’ve
lost the country.’”21 The Tet Offensive, despite its strategic failures, marked a
turning point in the Vietnam War.
The United States military has failed to learn from its strategic
shortcomings even after observing the disaster that occurred in Vietnam. The
inability to acknowledge flawed strategy has and will lead to more military
blunders. “As the United States finds itself involved in a dire counterinsurgency
campaign in Afghanistan, with little apparent reason for optimism, some political
scientists have turned their attention to the origins and development of U.S
military strategy in Vietnam for readily applicable lessons.”22 The application of
Sun Tzu’s The Art of War will result in victory, but the United States military
continues to take the traditional approach, failing to understand the error of their
ways. The United States military has been repeating the same action for
decades, expecting a different result. Unless you adapt you are destined to fail,
be it in Vietnam or in Afghanistan.
The Vietnam War provides us with evidence that Sun Tzu’s The Art of War
stands the test of time. The Art of War strategies and tactics used by Sun Tzu in
500 BCE are applicable to modern and future wars because Sun Tzu stripped
war down to the bones. Sun Tzu identified the underlying factors that determine
who will be victorious on the battlefield, but he also understood the political and
social implications of waging war. War is much more than fighting or moving
pawns on a board, a war can be won or lost without a single battle being fought,
it is life and it is death. The most important factor that Sun Tzu teaches is
knowledge because, “He who knows neither self nor enemy will fail in every
battle.”23 Being able to collect knowledge and the application of that knowledge
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are two of the most critical aspects of warfare. The Art of War and its teachings
will be immortal because the basic tenants of war never change.
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